

## 0. Outline and Summary

This report analyzes the history of a single endowment by an Ottoman governor of Egypt, Masih Pasha, and its link to the waqf's main beneficiaries, shaykh Nur ad-Din 'Ali al-Qarafi and his descendents.

After a brief introduction on sources and methods, I turn to the founder and his times. This section brings together information about Ottoman governors; endowments in early-Ottoman Egypt; Masih Pasha as a governor... All this is meant to serve as background—to situate Masih's choices in a wider political, social, and cultural milieu.

The rest of the report is composed of two main sections. In **Section III**, we turn to Masih's act of endowment and investigate some of his choices in designing his elaborate complex. Based mostly on Masih's generously detailed *waqfiyya* (and addenda), this section is a micro-analysis of the endowment including its various **institutional** features; the **salaries** specified for the personnel; the assets endowed to the complex (agricultural property). To make sense of some of these figures, reference is made to contemporaneous comparanda, viz., other early-Ottoman (i.e. late 10th/16th c.) endowments, e.g. salaries from al-Kulshani's waqf (1540 A.D.).

**Section IV** presents a detailed micro-study of the family of Nur ad-Din 'Ali al-Qarafi, the Sufi shaykh revered by Masih Pasha; descendents of Nur ad-Din are stipulated as the primary (default) occupants of the complex's numerous positions and these clauses in the waqfiyya practically forge a long-term stable link between the family and the endowment complex—a bond that informs not only where they physically reside, but also how they are named over the course of decades (arguably, centuries). Specifically, I have searched for any/all records related to the family and the waqf in the *mahakim* court records and the resulting paper trail of the endowment allows a reconstruction of (some of) Nur ad-Din's family for six generations (late 10th/16th – early 12th/18th centuries). Several themes are discussed in detail:

- **Onomastic patterns** (of both Nur ad-Din's family and other comparable/contemporary families, including two other Qarafiyya lineages: **al-Kurani-*thumm*-Qarafi** [9th/15th c.] and **Badr ad-Din al-Qarafi al-Maliki** [late 10th/16th c.]. Here I treat certain features of naming patterns and practices.
- **Gender:** Our searches (inc. other families and namesakes) showed numerous women deriving incomes and administrative positions from endowments like Masih Pasha's. In the case of Nur ad-Din's family, however, only two sisters appear in the reconstructed family tree (i.e. only two women were active *and* left a trace in court records—and they derived incomes from a different waqf). By contrast, the family of his neighbor and namesake, **Badr ad-Din**, includes several women (daughters but also one freed slave-girl) who derived incomes from family endowments. Indeed upon comparing the two families, Nur ad-Din's emerges as a remarkably **masculine** (patriarchal) line; this was not a feature of waqf or Islamic law, per se—both families worked within the same constraints and availed themselves of the same legal/property instruments—but, we argue, was linked to specific clauses in Masih's endowment.
- **Kin:** These clauses, while technically inclusive (they did not bar women from succeeding to positions/incomes outright) did arrange devolution according to specific preferences, e.g. descendants from the patrilineal line were always given priority to succession over those from the uterine [*awlad az-zabr > -al-batn*] and they also seem to have discouraged the break-down of the main *naẓar/tabadduth* job through inheritance. The result is that any/all direct references to Overseer of Waqf Masih (= Waqf Nur ad-Din al-Q) are **held by a single male individual** at any one point in time. Figure 2b plots these contenders to the *naẓar/tabadduth* jobs: the graph shows that Masih's succession clauses *practically* translated into a **near-primogenitary principle**.

- NB: Younger sons and daughters did get appointments to jobs in the waqf—e.g. *qira'a* and *shabada*—just not the influential managerial position, *nazar/tabadduth*.<sup>1</sup>
- While this worked to exclude women and younger sons<sup>2</sup> it also saved the waqf from a near-certain fate that is observed in numerous other *awqaf*: the fragmentation through inheritance of jobs into small fractions. Thus, after 4-5 generations, various individuals are technically sharing a job like lighting lamps—i.e. sharing its income—but with such small fractions, no one actually performs the work. In this case, the patrilineal and primogenitary logic of the waqfiyya (of devolution of office) saved Masih's waqf from a common systemic fault that contributed to the long-term dilapidation of numerous other endowments.
- **Family and Waqf:** This section looks at a few instances where waqf appears central not only as a tool used by families, but also as **a basic condition that informed the development and very nature of 'family.'** Perhaps most interesting is the intersection between Nur ad-Din's family and that of Jarbash al-'Umari. The two abovementioned sisters—the only women we could trace through court records on Figure 2—derived incomes from their *maternal* grandfather's waqf, i.e. that of Jarbash in 1071 A.H. While the jobs seem to derive from the kinship link, closer examination reveals that Nazrene and Khadija were not the first Qarafiyya to occupy Jarbash-waqf jobs: their father [A4b] in 1035 A.H. has a salary, but earlier still, their paternal uncle [A4x] gets the *qira'a* in 1014 A.H.
  - In other words, it is likely that waqf—and the web of jobs and functions generated by these endowments—were the initial link between the families, possibly even the backdrop to the marriage between bint Jarbash and Muhammad ... al-Qarafi [A4b].
- A similar link through waqf appears in the Masih-Nur ad-Din connection (something all sources are silent about): both parties appear as beneficiaries of adjoining endowed agricultural land. Finally our comparative case (Badr ad-Din al-Qarafi) turns out to have met and officiated over at least one of Nur ad-Din's family's court records.
- In Badr ad-Din al-Qarafi's family tree we observe another feature (which doesn't appear in Nur ad-Din's family but was clearly common in Ottoman-era households and families): the extension of family beyond biological kin. In al-Badr's family, we have both a male and female manumitted slaves who succeed to family waqf jobs.
- **Waqf and Family Occupational Patterns:** Here it is argued from the case-study that *waqf* has another constitutive role in the development of family, namely, occupational choices. Because Masih's *waqfiyya* conditions include a leitmotif assigning Nur ad-Din's descendants jobs within the complex, the family's association with the endowment practically shapes the careers of its descendents, one generation after the other. Thus, a disproportionate number of them become mid-level religious functionaries, e.g. *imams* and teachers (of children).
  - **Also related: Family's Geographical Stability** The family—especially in this case, given the size of Masih's complex and its inclusion of living quarters that are assigned to the waqf officials *ex officio*—through its association with the waqf has no incentive to move, indeed, it has a positive motive to remain in the Qarafa.
  - **From the geographical stability of the Qarafis** we can also begin to imagine the central role a waqf like Masih played in the development of a neighboring community. The large scale of the

<sup>1</sup> This is clearly an original pattern for we already see it in the very waqfiyya's apportioning of first incumbents to jobs: for example, Nur ad-Din's grandson through his daughter, Muhammad al-Quni [B3] gets several jobs—*waqqad*, *farrash*, *banwab*—thence the residence that goes to their incumbent on the complex grounds, but he is not mentioned at all in relation to the *nazar/tabadduth*. See *Waqfiyyat Masih...* p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> One exception: A5b, Nur ad-Din 'Ali in the 1090s A.H. who seems to get it after brother Yusuf [A5a]. I need the **ORIGINAL for all four documents** in which this Nur ad-Din 'Ali III [i.e. the third!] appears: 25/10/1092, 23/12/1092, 7/5/1098, and 20/9/1098

waqf—providing for scores of orphans; for elderly sick (poor) women; for Sufis—thus has an important role in the demographic development of the neighborhood, i.e. which people not only frequent the complex, but inevitably, come to settle near it.

- Indeed the very **constitution of the neighborhood** is also informed by legal acts (esp. awqaf like Masih's)—its population is officially identified **as a collectivity, a specific social group** in one of the waqfiyyas office devolution clauses (preference is given to residents of the neighborhood should no descendent of Nur ad-Din exist/be suitable).
- This is all the more relevant and important once we situate Masih's large and multi-institutional waqf on a map: the complex was one of the few large-scale (read: well endowed) Ottoman projects of development in the Southern Qarafa. It represented a vital income stream to an area destined for steady urban/financial decline over the course of three centuries.
- With the Qarafis playing a prominent role in dispensing the various charitable services, the members of the family get to amass crucial **social capital**: they become the pillars of the community and its organic leaders. This in turn, and over time, allows for the stability of the family and its continuity.
- All of these factors worked to forge strong ties between family and waqf, whereby the fortunes of one were inextricably bound to those of the other. Since the Qarafiyya knew full well how closely and intimately their fortunes were tied to that of Masih's complex, they had the best of all incentives to ensure the endowment's survival and stability: self-interest.
- **Waqf and Political Authority** One of the most interesting clauses in Masih's waqfiyya concentrates the power of administration and fiscal management strictly within the hands of the *naẓīr/mutahaddith*—explicitly to the exclusion of judges and other political authorities (e.g. *amir* and *daftardar*). I offer a reason for the surprising clause: Masih, as governor, knew full well the default privileges of the Chief Judge to appoint Accounting Overseers who could reverse a *Naẓīr's* decisions and prudently wrote out such a possibility through his stern warning in the waqfiyya. His words were also prescient given
  - **Decentralization Developments in 12th/18th-century Egypt** whereby the power of Mamluk umara' and households in general grew at the expense of the Ottoman governor (as well as any semblance of an independent judiciary). The result was that members of the military establishment increasingly interfered in judicial/legal as well as financial affairs, including management of awqaf.
  - **One of the last (uninterrupted) legal traces of our Qarafiyya family** appears in the last decade of 11th/17th century and it is telling that it consists of a legal suit dated 8/1/1093 A.H. brought forth by Shihab ad-Din Ahmad II [A6a] against someone he claims is over-reaching and assuming privileges that are only his own. The picture becomes clearer when we realize that his paternal uncle [‘amm]—who held the *naẓār* before him—appeared only a **few weeks earlier** (in 23/12/1092) in a *tasaduq* with a group of several individuals *including members of Mamluk households* (e.g. from Tai'fat Mustahfazan) who certify that he does not owe them anything from the accounts of Masih Waqf. Finally, some 15 years earlier, in 1075 A.H. we have the most suggestive detail: the appointment of the **first non-Qarafi person as nazir/mutahaddith over Waqf Masih: one Amir Yusuf Beyk** (whose father was incidentally, Daftardar Diwan Mistr). While more details are required, the three incidents evidence a new presence in the legal trail of Waqf Masih: the unmistakable emergence of new loci of power (members of Mamluk households) who are increasingly meddling in the affairs of endowments.
    - It is all the more striking here that this is the **very last uninterrupted trace of the Qarafiyya on the legal record**. After this point, I have not been able to locate any direct references either to the descendents of Nur ad-Din or to Masih Pasha's endowment.
    - Other waqf studies provide comparative information about other comparable endowments: in general, awqaf tended to follow a **cycle of about once century** after which time, various ploys and subterfuges were deployed to **reabsorb the alienated assets** [*manqūfat, khairat*]

back into the market, esp. state finances—in some cases by nullifying the endowment, in others through substituting assets [*istibdal*].

- **This was all the more important in the case of Masih's Waqf given that the endowment's revenues derived from mostly agricultural property**—which the state tended to impress with regularity. It is also important here to recall that the very state of these agricultural lands is an important part of this history: a slump in agricultural production (be it systemic/long-term or episodic) had an immediate effect on all those urban endowments that depended on such agricultural revenue for their monthly expenditure (not to mention long-term upkeep and renovation).
- Until, that is, we get to an unusual *mahdar* in 1928 A.D. wherein we see three siblings assert their right to manage the endowment and explicitly identify themselves as the descendants of Nur ad-Din al-Qarafi (albeit now they have even appended the epithet *al-Masihyya* to their names—clearly in attempt to further establish their rightful claim to the position). See Figure 4 and the notes therein. From their lineal names, it is possible to go back to ca. mid-19th century, which is the only other reference to Masih's Waqf in the modern period—but a tantalizing one at that, since Ali Mubarak asserts that the waqf is functioning in his times.
  - **There is no reason to doubt the claims of the litigants in the 1928 document** (it is arguably just as reliable as the earlier mahakim documents used here). This means that the descendants of Nur ad-Din Qarafi continue to leave legal traces from the late 10th/16th until the early 14th/20th, which is remarkable.
  - From the above, we conclude by arguing that the **waqf of Masih played a critical role in stabilization, continuity, and social reproduction of this particular family**. Not only were the family's fortunes tied to their prominent roles in administering the endowment, but their **very name also appears to have changed/developed to perform and announce that very link** (including their claims to succession, which they invariably did at court by referring to their ancestor [*jadd*], shaykh Nur ad-Din).
  - **Comparative Aside:** In early modern England, most estates were left for the eldest son (strict primogeniture was observed by statute and in practice). But a sizeable portion of families were not succeeded by a son at all, and in that case many testators resorted to the *name and arm clause*—a legal stipulation according to which an heir would only inherit their share upon **changing his surname to that of the testator so as to ensure the continuity of the surname/estate/family**. Early modern Egypt knew neither primogeniture nor the names and arms clause as devolution strategies. But the Masih Pasha *waqfiyya*—for a variety of reasons including the personal [Masih as an expatriate eunuch], historical [Ottoman waqf and legal praxis], familial [i.e. that of al-Nuri Qarafiyya], and religious [association with a Sufi shaykh *and* his particular preference to found particular devotional institutions]—created the conditions that ensured **familial continuity, in both lineage and name, was ensured through a practical** (in both senses of the word) **primogeniture (at least vis-à-vis office of *nazar/tahadduth*)**.

### Figures (Family Trees)

Figure 1 – **How Names Behave:** Kurani-*thumm*-Qarafi family (9th/15th c.);

Figure 2 - **Family of Nur ad-Din 'Ali al-Qarafi** (late 10th/16th – early 12th/18th centuries, 6 generations); all descendants of Nur ad-Din receive unique personal ID#s to which the text refers [e.g. A5b indicates a 5th-generation second-son male, etc.]

Figure 2b – Tree of *Nazar/tahadduth* Job Incumbents

Figure 3 – Comparanda: **Badr ad-Din al-Qarafi al-Maliki** (10th/16th c. onwards)<sup>3</sup>;

Figure 4 – **The Last Installment of Nur ad-Din al-Qarafi: Evidence from 1284/1928 *mahdar***

<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately Figs. 2/2b seems lost for good and I need to redraw them from scratch (I didn't even have printouts). I am including earlier version I used in June presentation; the final version is more detailed and extends a few more generations.



## **I. Methodology and Sources**

- a. Micro- & Family History: A Note on Method
- b. Secondary Lit Review
- c. Primary Sources
- d. Problematique: This Report

## **II. Background Story**

- a. Masih Pasha: Background, Biography, Times

## **III. Masih's Endowed Complex**

- a. Location
- b. Suspicious Dating of Waqfiyya
- c. Masih's Choices: Complex Functions, Egypt
- d. Waqf's Finances: The income-generating agricultural *manqufat*
- e. Institutional Functions within Masih's Complex
- f. Salaries (as in *waqfiyya*)
  - i. Contemporary Comparanda
- g. Judicial Trail: taqarir etc.: Waqf and Legal/Court Practice

## **IV. Study: Observations on Patterns in Family & Waqf History**

- a. Onomastic Patterns
  - i. How Names Behave [Figure 1. Kurani-Qarafi family]
  - ii. Patterns
  - iii. Emulative Patterns; Choices in representation
- b. Gender
  - i. KIN: (functional) primogenitary
- c. Family and Waqf/Property
  - i. Possible connection to Masih
  - ii. **Connections to Badr ad-Din**
  - iii. *Jadd* ancestral link
    1. Union with Jarbash (Waqf)—marriage or waqf
  - iv. Non-Biological Kin—Tabi' and Freedmen [utaqa' in al-Badr Tree]
  - v. Occupational Seeds and Patterns; Attendant Communal Development
    1. Waqf and Charity: Moral Authority, Local Community
    2. Q's Social Capital
- d. Waqf and Political Authority: A Clause and the Sudden Disappearance of a Dense Record
  - i. **WAQF and Qarafi Family Stability**
  - ii. **Last Trail**
  - iii. Long-Term Systemic problems of Waqf Fiscal Revenue and Administration
  - iv. Intervention from Political Authority (the 12th/18th c.)
  - v. Incident Ramadan 1123/1711 A.D.

## **V. Main Conclusions: Waqf and Family**

- a. Restoring dynamic and practical logic of waqf as F-Strategy
- b. Waqf and Personal choices (trans. into legal/religious dicta)
- c. Stabilize family/name
- d. Waqf survives bc of intertwined fortunes
- e. (Functional) Primogenitural clause/devolution